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Understanding sport clubs as sport policy implementers – a theoretical framework for the analysis 
of the implementation of central sport policy through local and voluntary sport organizations 
 
Abstract This article aims at developing a theoretical framework for analysing the implementation of 
sport policy, as it is conducted by voluntary sport clubs at grass root level. First, three options are 
presented and discussed: (i) a classical top-down implementation model, (ii) the governance theory 
of policy tools, and (iii) the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Second, the theoretical perspectives are 
discussed, and criticized for failing to take sufficiently into account the implementing body of sport 
policy, namely the voluntary sport clubs. In that respect, an alternative theoretical framework is 
suggested as a possible solution for analysing the implementation of sport policy; which is the 
translation perspective of neo-institutionalism. It stresses that, if elements of central policy influence 
the implementation process at the local level, it does so by the active import, interpretation and 
implementation of it in the local context. The autonomy of the local sport club in relation to central 
policy is reinforced by the fact that the activity in sport clubs is mainly done on a voluntary basis.  
 
Key words Policy implementation, Theoretical framework, Sport clubs, Norwegian case. 
 
The way from policy making at the national level to the implementation of the policy at the local 
level is long and uneasy. In Norway, the policy is most often made by full- time employees and takes 
place in a state department or in the central staff of the umbrella organization of sports, while the 
implementation of policy is usually conducted by volunteers in local sport clubs (Enjolras & Waldahl, 
2007). (Whether it actually is central sport policy that is implemented is a question that, often 
implicitly but sometimes explicitly, will be discussed through out the article.) Every part of the 
process from top to bottom has its characteristics and has the potential for being studied 
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scientifically applying different theories. In general, however, it is probably fair to say that the 
theoretical development within the studies of the implementation of sport policy and in the field of 
sport organization, is rather low (Houlihan, 2005; Seippel, 2005a, 2006; Skille, 2005).  
Another way of approaching the problem, rather than stating that there is a long way from 
top to bottom, is to take the grass root level as the point of departure. But research into such 
organizations is rather inadequate; a search of literature reveals studies of international sport 
organizations (e.g. Lee, 2004), most on national sports governing bodies (e.g. Amis & Slack, 2004; 
Chelladurai, Szyslo, & Haggerty, 1987; Kikulis, 2000; Kikulis et al., 1995; Slack & Hinings, 1992), and 
professional sports franchises (e.g. Cousens & Slack, 2005; O’Brian & Slack, 2004). The study of those 
organizations which promote and provide sport activity at grass-root level is notably missing. In 
addition, the transferability of the above cited studies into the Scandinavian context is limited. 
As a consequence, the framework of a theory is underdeveloped. In this article, the objective 
is to shed light on the issue of the local sport club and its relation to central policy, and to discuss 
various theoretical frameworks which may aim at taking into account the grass root of sport 
organizations, namely the sport club, and its relation to central sport policy. In short: the aim of the 
article is to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of central sport policy, as it is perceived 
from the perspective of the sport club. That does not mean that other levels of analysis will be 
overlooked; from the perspective of the local sport club, one can also take into account the 
environment which is relevant for the provision of activity.  
Before proceeding to the main parts, a note on general context is needed. (The structural-
organizational elements of sport policy implementation are treated in more detail below.) In general, 
the Nordic countries are welfare states, historically with a social democratic ideology, and with a 
combination of both a strong state and a significant civic involvement. Based on a vision of sport for 
all, the Nordic model of sport and sport policy has the following characteristics. First, sport is 
primarily voluntary, in two interrelated respects. Participation is based on individual membership in a 
 5 
sport club (and hence in the affiliated federation), and the activity is conducted on a voluntary basis. 
Second, sport policy relies on a mutual dependency (Norberg, 1998) between the public and the 
voluntary sector, with a division of responsibility between the state and the sport organization. While 
the former provides facilities and economic support for the sport organizations, the latter provides 
activity with a high degree of autonomy. Third, the implementation of sport policy relies on the 
monopolistic umbrella organization of sport, and on the voluntary implementers at the local level 
(Bergsgard et al., 2007).  
The article is structured as follows. First, some theoretical possibilities for different levels of 
analysis of sport policy will be posed and discussed. During the presentation of the first of these 
theories, the context of Norwegian sport and Norwegian sport policy will be sketched as an 
integrated part (of the theoretical presentation). A critique of each theoretical perspective will be 
added. Second, an alternative theoretical perspective will be presented, which takes the local sport 
club as its point of departure and which builds on the sociological perspective of neo-institutionalism. 
The theory will be the object of reflection about its application, with regard to subsequent empirical 
analysis of the phenomenon (see Skille, 2006; Skille & Skirstad, 2007). 
Three theoretical approaches to the study of sport policy 
Houlihan (2005) notes that there is a lack of theory development, with regard to frameworks for 
analyzing sport policy (for theorising of sport policy-making in Norway, see Enjolras & Waldahl, 
2007). As already stated, different theories are applied, and should be applied, at different levels of 
the analysis of sport policy. Further on, I will sketch three theoretical frameworks that have been 
applied in studies of sport policy-making and implementation, focusing on the latter. It is not my 
intention either to review all possible alternatives or to create a general theory applicable at all levels 
or in all contexts; it is rather to shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of some of the existing 
theories, before going into the issue of finding a theory which is appropriate for the analysis of the 
(Norwegian) sport club’s relationship to central policy.  
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 The presentation of theories will follow this structure. First, a model of implementation with 
a classic top-down perspective will be presented, alongside the presentation of the context of 
Norwegian sport and sport policy; in that respect, the relationship between the public and the 
voluntary sector is crucial. Second, focusing on the relationship between the policy-making body of 
the state and the implementing body of the voluntary sport organization(s), a sociological 
governance theory will be presented, namely that of policy tools. Third, trying to combine (taking the 
best from each perspective) top-down and from bottom-up perspectives, the political science theory 
of advocacy coalition framework (ACF) will be presented.i  
A top-down implementation model and the Norwegian context 
Based on the empirical evidence of Norwegian sport policy, Skille (2005a) has applied the 
implementation model of van Meter and van Horn (1975) to point out that the central level of policy 
making and the local level of sports provision are ‘two worlds of Norwegian sport’. In the 
implementation model the starting point is the decision makers’ definition of objectives and the 
allocation of recourses. Then three sets of filtering variables come into play: characteristics of the 
implementing bodies, organizational communication, as well as economic and political conditions. 
When the implementation model of van Meter and van Horn (1975) is presented in a simplified 
version, I find it appropriate to present the Norwegian context simultaneously.   
 --- Figure 1 about here ---  
 At the state level the decision makers can be divided in two. First, the Parliament treats and 
verifies the White Paper on sport, which makes up the general guidelines for state sport policy. 
Second, the Department of Sport Policy (DSP) administrates the White Paper’s content on a day-to-
day basis. The economic basis for so doing is the revenues of the state- controlled gambling agency 
(Norsk Tipping AS). The gambling revenues are not treated in the Parliament as part of the national 
budget, but are transferred directly from the gambling agency to the DSP (Goksøyr, 1992; Goksøyr et 
al., 1996; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007).  
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In Norway, the implementing bodies of sport are all federated in the Norwegian Olympic 
Committee and Confederation of Sports (NOC) (see Figure 1). The NOC system comprises a number 
of organizations, which are organized in two historically constituted lines (Goksøyr et al., 1996). One 
line takes care of the common sport policy at various levels, and includes: District Sport Associations 
(DSA, n = 19), one for each county; and Local Sport Councils (LSC, n = 380), one in every municipality 
with more than three sport clubs. The other, so-called special sport federation line, includes: Special 
Sport Federationsii (SSF, n = 56), in principle each SSF governs one sport, nationally and is the 
connection to the international SSF; and Special District Sport Associations (DSSA), which are regional 
organizations of SSF, governing the sport in every county with an appropriate number of sport clubs 
with that particular sport on its programme (NIF, 2004). On top, the lines merge into the central 
NOC, and at the bottom are the sport clubs (SC, n = 7.500). A major point for the subsequent 
development and discussion of an appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
implementation of sport policy is the fact that it is the sport clubs that provide sport activity.iii  
The communication between the body of policy making (the Department of Sport Policy, 
DSP) and the implementing body (the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports, 
NOC), is characterized by annual transactions from the DSP to the NOC, followed by an assignment 
letter. The NOC has a monopoly on state subsidies, being the only organization to receive such 
funding (KKD, 2006). In addition, there are few routines for reporting back to the DSP, and there is no 
monitoring of how the subsidies are spent. In short, the communication between the DSP and the 
NOC builds on a mutual dependency and a historically-developed trust (Goksøyr et al., 1996; Enjolras, 
2004, 2005; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007). 
The economic and political conditions have to be seen together. The political position of the 
government in office has little influence on sports matters, because the state’s money to sport is 
distributed outside the Parliament negotiations (KKD, 1992). It is based on the revenues from the 
state’s gambling agency, and is administrated solely by bureaucrats in the DSP. Although there is a 
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theoretical possibility for the DSP to allocate the money to other recipients, the NOC has, as 
mentioned above, developed a monopoly and autonomy with regard to public funding for sport 
(Goksøyr et al., 1996; Olstad, 1987; Tønnesson, 1986).  
The implementation model ends with a bottle neck (literally if the figure is read from left to 
right, see Figure 2), where the process of implementation depends on the dispositions – that is the 
ability and willingness – of the grass-root implementers (van Meter & van Horn, 1975: 472-4). Thus 
‘the goals of policy may be rejected for a variety of reasons’, such as offending the implementer’s 
values and self interest, or crossing other organisational loyalties or preferred/existing relationships 
(van Meter & van Horn, 1975: 473). With regard to Norwegian sport, the grass-root implementer 
who is in face-to-face interaction with the target groups of the sport policy is in most cases a 
volunteer in a local sport club, basically motivated for the reasons of having his/her own children as 
participants (Enjolras & Seippel, 2001; Seippel, 2003).  
--- Figure 2 about here ---  
Figure 2, which is a modified (by Kjellberg & Reitan, 1995: 143) version of the 
implementation model of van Meter and van Horn (1975: 463), shows two main features. First, it is a 
‘long, winding road’ with many possible constraints and many contingencies to take into 
consideration, between the time when objectives are defined and the outcome of a policy. Second, 
the outcome of a general policy or a specific programme always depends on the grass-root 
implementer. Hence, the professional bureaucrats of the DSP of the state cooperate with the 
employed and professional staff of the central level of the NOC, and do not have the possibility to 
communicate directly with each of the 7.500 local sport clubs. That problem of the implementation 
model has to be seen in relation with the following point of critique. 
The model of implementation forwarded by van Meter and van Horn (1975) is designed for 
analyses of the public sector. In that respect, the grass-root implementer would be a medical doctor, 
a policeman or another street level bureaucrat employed by the state. That does not mean that 
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things would have been easy and straightforward if the street-level workers were public officials. 
First, the implementation process is up to those implementing it, and they do not necessarily share 
the objectives of their superiors (Lipsky, 1980). Second, when street-level bureaucrats make 
judgements on government policy (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), they are not only 
implementing but actually making policy. In sum, the line between policy making and 
implementation is at best blurred. 
However, while the grass-root implementer represents the voluntary system of the NOC, 
he/she is not obliged to follow the guidelines from the top in the way that a civil servant would – 
theoretically at least – be. Therefore, a critique of this model of implementation,is that it does not 
discuss such variations as, for example, along the axis of professionals—volunteers (see Enjolras & 
Seippel, 2001; Seippel, 2003). That is a point that Seippel (2005a, 2006) aims to overcome, when he 
treats Norwegian sport policy in terms of public policy tools.  
Public policy tools  
As stated above, Seippel (2005a, 2006) takes as the point of departure for his analysis of Norwegian 
sport policy the tools of which the public sector has available to implement the public policy by using 
the voluntary sport organization. Seippel (2005a, 2006) presents a theoretical approach where he 
seeks to develop a link between the implementation process and the outcome of sport policy, or 
rather various sport policies, drawing on Salamon’s (2002) concept of public policy tools. It is based 
on the tradition of governance, which allows the policy arena to have a less clear and hierarchical 
structure than what often characterizes public policy. The implementation process depends more on 
cooperation, negotiation and social networks than hierarchy, demand and supply. With specific 
regard to the voluntary sector, two aspects are often emphasized; first, it provides certain goods 
better than do other actors and, second, the role of voluntary organizations is important because 
they may operate more visionary or normative-oriented than market-forces or political actors 
(Seippel, 2006).  
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According to Salamon, a tool, or instrument, of public action is an ‘identifiable method 
through which collective action is structured to address a public problem’ (Salamon, 2002: 19). The 
following dimensions are characteristics of various policy tools (Salamon, 2002: 20): type of good 
which is provided, type of vehicle of provision, type of delivery system and the set of rules of the 
method which is applied. Based on these dimensions, Seippel (2005a) identifies three tools with 
relevance for, and which can be identified as being in use in Norwegian sport policy.  
First, ‘public information’ (Weiss, 2002) aims to influence the thoughts and knowledge of 
people. ‘Policymakers inform an audience of target actors about a policy issue or pattern of 
behaviour to influence what people think, know, or believe when they engage in target behaviour’ 
(Weiss, 2002: 218). Public information is manifested in written documents, such as a White Paper on 
sport. Thus, the written documents from the Parliament and the Government are supposed to please 
the whole population, and are rather ambiguous. On the one hand, visions, such as ‘sport for all’, are 
vague and at best hard – if at all possible – to measure. On the other hand, this tool is based on a 
rational actor thinking; with regard to the receivers of the public policy, it is believed that knowledge 
and information leads to the ‘right’ kind of practice among the general public. For example,  a 
knowledge of the health benefits of physical activity should, with to a rational actor response to that 
information, lead to a recommended level of physical activity for the entire population. That is, 
however, not the case. 
Second, acknowledging that information is not a sufficient tool, ‘grants’ (Beam & Conlan, 
2002) may be used. Grants are ‘payments from a donor government to a recipient organization 
(typically public or non-profit) or an individual. More specifically, they are a gift that has the aim of 
either “stimulating” or “supporting” some sort of service or activity by the recipient’ (Beam & Conlan, 
2002: 341). In the Norwegian context the grantor is the DSP, while the recipient is the NOC.iv While 
general grants, as in the case of Norwegian sport, mainly go to different parts of a federation of 
organizations, general grants may ‘cloud the chain of accountability’ (Beam & Conlan, 2002: 372). An 
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empirical example of an evaluation of the Norwegian system reveals that it is hard to measure what 
the government gets out of the economic subsidies to sport (Enjolras, 2004, 2005). First, it is hard to 
identify the goals of the policy. Second, the transparency of the stream of money is low. And third, 
and related to the two former, it is difficult to create primary measurements for such evaluations.v In 
sum, in relation to the two most used tools, the government does not have a system of sanctions, 
which is often considered important for achieving compliance with the policy (Hood, 1983).  
Third, and as a consequence of the lack of possibilities for monitoring the effects of general 
grants and the related lack of possibilities for the Government to control the use of grants, the 
development goes in the direction of increased use of contracts (Kelman, 2002). ‘Contracting, as a 
tool of government, is a business arrangement between a government agency and a private entity in 
which the private entity promises, in exchange for money, to deliver certain products or services to 
the government …’ (Kelman, 2002: 282). Throughout the history of Norwegian sport policy, the use 
of targeted economic subsidies has varied (Goksøyr et al., 1996). In that respect, contemporary sport 
policy is ambiguous. On the one hand, there are less-targeted subsidies from the DSP to the NOC, 
compared to earlier periods. On the other hand, the state requires more monitoring and reporting 
about how the subsidies are spent in accordance to governmental goals than before (Enjolras, 2004, 
2005).  
Contracting adds some new elements to the tool concept, compared to the two former 
(information and grants). First the recipient is a more active agent. In that respect, the relationship, 
between policy maker and grantor on the one side, and the implementer and recipient on the other 
side, become dialectic. Thus, in the concept of contract there is an implicit possibility for 
negotiations, which paves the way for the implementing recipients to set their own goals before 
going into a reciprocal relationship with (for example) the state which defines the sport policy. 
Second, contracts are more restrictive than the two other tools (Kelman, 2002). 
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 Salamon (2002: 22-24) suggests five evaluation criteria for policy tools. The three basic 
criteria are: effectiveness (e.g., do information, grants and contracts from the government make 
people become physically active?), efficiency (e.g., how much physical activity does the government 
get out of each euro?), equity (e.g., does the sport policy work for all inhabitants?). In addition, two 
governing criteria are: manageability, which ‘refers to the ease or difficulty involved in operating 
programs’ (Salamon, 2002: 24), and legitimacy: ‘no matter what the prospects for effectiveness, a 
program that cannot win the political support cannot make headway’ (Salamon, 2002: 24). As stated 
above, research into Norwegian sport show that it is difficult to measure efficiency. Moreover, 
research indicates that the latter (legitimacy) is prioritized on behalf of the four former: political 
legitimacy goes before effectiveness, efficiency, equity and the opportunities of implementing sport 
policy (Skille, 2004a, b, 2005b).  
Further, Salamon (2002: 24-37) discusses some ‘key tool dimensions’, which, based on the 
above-mentioned criteria make it possible to do a more precise identification of policy tools. In that 
respect, the above-cited research (Skille, 2004a, b, 2005b) also revealed that – expressed with the 
vocabulary and concepts of Salamon’s public policy tools – the key tool dimension ‘automaticity’ 
(Salamon, 2002: 32-35) works more heavily than other key dimensions of policy tools, such as degree 
of coerciveness, directedness and visibility. For example, when the state is to implement a ‘new’ 
sport policy, choosing an established organization within the Norwegian context, namely the NOC, 
happens automatically. 
 With the application of Salamon’s (2002) concept of policy tools, Seippel’s (2005a, 2006) 
approach may be considered a perspective which aims to explain how the state implements its policy 
by the application of a voluntary system. But, it has its limitations, because, as Seippel (2005a) 
emphasizes, Norwegian sport is not only primarily voluntary, but the degree of volunteerism 
increases with lower level of organisation, and  clearly dominates the work of the local sport clubs 
compared to the full time employes dominating the state bureaucracy of the DSP and the central 
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administration of the NOC (cf. Figure 1). As long as the grass-root implementer and the central-level 
decision maker live in such different worlds (as may also be the case in the public sector, Lipsky, 
1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), and as long as the grass-root implementer has no 
obligations for the decision maker in the public policy system (nor has the latter effective sanctions, 
Hood, 1983), the perspective seems inappropriate. Having said that; it is time to move on to the next 
theoretical perspective, namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework.  
Advocacy Coalition Framework  
The presentation of Houlihan’s (2005) approach which follows sums up much of the above-
mentioned perspectives, because Houlihan starts out by presenting different theories for policy 
analysis. His outset is that ‘the increase in governmental interest in sport has not been matched by 
an equivalent increase in the analysis of public policy for sport’ (Houlihan, 2005: 164). Houlihan 
sketches four different theoretical solutions for analyzing sport policy, vi  and he advocates the 
‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’ (ACF) which ‘has a broader focus than many of its rivals and has the 
potential to illuminate aspects of the policy process beyond a preoccupation with agenda setting’ 
(Houlihan, 2005: 174). With reference to three British studies,vii Houlihan (2005: 174) holds that ‘the 
ACF was a valuable starting point for the development of analytical frameworks capable of 
illuminating the sport policy area’.  
The ACF was initiated as an alternative to former models and to take into account the best 
from top-down and bottom-up perspectives, and to give technical information a more prominent 
role in policy process theory (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). ‘A key feature of the 
ACF, therefore, is its focus on the policy process as a whole’ (Green & Houlihan, 2005: 14), where the 
aim is to analyze policy change on the basis of three sets of processes. The main process is that of the 
policy subsystem, where competing coalitions try to influence the decisions to be made by 
government authorities. A subsystem refers to a set of actors from the public and the private sector 
who are concerned with the same policy problem, ‘… and who regularly seek to influence public 
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policy in that domain’ (Sabatier, 1998: 99; Sabatier & Jenkins- Smith, 1999: 119). It is an innovative 
feature of the ACF to challenge the assumption ‘that an actor’s organizational affiliation is primordial’ 
(Sabatier, 1998; 107; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 127). A coalition may comprise elected, 
employed and voluntary officials from the public and the private/voluntary sector, as well as 
journalists, researchers and others.  
The other processes involved in the ACF are external to, or rather surrounding (parts of) the 
society of/for, the subsystem. These are, first, constraining (for the subsystem’s actors) and stable 
parameters such as social structure and constitutive rules. Second, and more variable are the events 
comprised by socio-economic conditions and technology, changes in governing coalitions for 
example after elections, public opinion, and decisions made in other subsystems that might influence 
the subsystem under investigation. Important in the ACF is the dialectic interplay between the 
external factors, between the external factors and the subsystem, and between the coalitions within 
the subsystem (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
However, a critique against the ACF is based on the fact that ‘the ACF clearly assumes that 
actors are instrumentally rational – i.e. they seek to use the information and other resources to 
achieve their goals’ (Sabatier, 1998: 108; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 130).viii Although the ACF 
implies collective action, based on coordinated individuals with a shared belief system, it does not 
take into account the influences of institutions, for example that ‘the institutional context within 
which coalitions decide their strategies ... affects their action’, or that ‘institutional coalitions may 
move among different levels of action in pursuit of policy change’ (Schlager, 1999: 250). Within the 
theory of institutions, the concept of power is central (see below), and it is striking that Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1999) have not identified a dominant coalition.ix 
Another critique is that, although the ACF is an effort to view the policy process as a whole, 
and despite the fact that it was created on the basis of ‘a desire to synthesize the best features of the 
“top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches’ (Sabatier, 1998: 98; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 117; 
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see also Green & Houlihan, 2005: 14), it does not consider the process of implementation accurately. 
As Houlihan notes: ‘in conclusion, it is acknowledged that this framework is not without its problems 
– for example, the identification of discrete levels of analysis, the articulation of the pattern of 
influence between levels, and the relative autonomy that each level enjoys’ (Houlihan, 2005: 182). 
The fact that each level of the processes of policy making and implementation has its relative 
autonomy, highlights the need for a theory focusing on the implementing body (see the one 
presented in the last part of this article).  
There is a third point, which cannot be considered as critique of the theory as such, but 
which is important as long as this discussion aims at finding a theory which is applicable to the 
Norwegian context. The theory’s presumption that there exists a coalition which comprises agents 
from various sectors (public representatives, voluntary organizations, journalists and researchers 
etc.) fits well with the Norwegian empirical situation. However, while the ACF assumes that there are 
two or more coalitions, the history of Norwegian sport policy, by contrast, shows signs of 
corporatism between the DSP and the NOC (Goksøyr et al., 1996; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007). On the 
contrary, perhaps a theory such as the ACF would open the eyes of (especially Norwegian) 
researchers and practitioners, and add some nuances to the picture which is usually painted of the 
Norwegian situation.  
Evaluation of the three theoretical frameworks   
Each of the above mentioned approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. The top-down 
perspective of van Meter and van Horn (1975) makes an important point about going from the 
policy-making process to the implementation process. The policy-tools perspective developed by 
Salamon (2002), as it is applied by Seippel (2005a), does have an empirical basis in the Norwegian 
context, and would probably work as an analytical tool for analyzing sport policy implementation in 
other countries, with similar arrangements between the state and the voluntary sport system (such 
as Denmark, Sweden, Germany). Further, the modified ACF presented by Houlihan (2005), which is 
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based on Sabatier (1998) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), does offer a framework for 
analyzing sport politics at the state level. And it is probably the theoretical framework of those 
presented that has been most often and most successfully applied in analyses of national level sport 
policy (e.g. Green & Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan & White, 2002; Parrish, 2003). However, all the 
theories mentioned above fail to take into account the executing body of sport policy 
implementation, namely the sport club. That is the body of organization where the political or 
organizational representatives meet the target groups of the policy in face-to-face interaction.  
With regard to the frameworks already applied to the Norwegian case (Skille, 2005a; Seippel, 
2005a, 2006), they both fail in trying to understand the receivers of the sport policy. Skille (2005a) 
identifies how the filtering variables (organizational arrangements and external constraints) and the 
dispositions of grass root implementers, between the decision makers defined objectives of a policy 
and the outcome of it, makes the way from top to bottom long and uneasy. However, the 
dispositions – that is ability and willingness – of the local implementers are only considered a 
constraint for the policy as it is made at the central level (van Meter & van Horn, 1975; Lipsky, 1980, 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). Therefore the model does not contribute to the understanding 
of the implementation of sport policy at the local level. To put it in a nutshell, and to apply an 
everlasting sociological concept, the sport clubs’ representatives are not – but must be if they are to 
be understood properly – conceived as active agents.  
Seippel (2005a) identifies tools for the top level to apply in the process of implementing its 
policy. However, it may be understood as if the target groups are passive receivers of sport policy 
made at the top. Houlihan’s (2005) perspective seems suitable for analysis of sport policy processes 
at the central (national) level, where it is not too far from the policy makers and the implementers. 
(See for example Green and Houlihan’s (2005) study of elite sport development, where the theory is 
applied elegantly.) But as long as I aim at finding a suitable theory for the analysis of the local and 
voluntary sport club, the ACF stops before going from central level of state sport policy to the 
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implementation of it. With regard to the study of the Norwegian sport club and its relationship to 
central sport politics and policy, it therefore seems inappropriate.  
In sum, there is a need for alternatives if the analysis of the local sport club and its 
relationship to central sport policy is to be analyzed properly. One alternative is of course to adopt 
from political science the opposite of the top-down perspective (i. e. van Meter & van Horn, 1975), 
namely a typical bottom-up perspective (Kjellberg & Reitan, 1995). Thus, the advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) seeks to integrate the top-down and the bottom-up approaches, as well as 
considering both internal (coalitions’) and external factors as influencing the political subsystems. 
Therefore, a pure bottom-up alternative, would not add much new to the analysis, in comparison 
with the theories presented above. I will, instead, build on a sociological perspective on the analysis 
of organization, and draw some lines from classic neo-institutionalism to later neo-institutionalism.x  
Neo-institutionalism – translation theory  
Neo-institutionalism focuses on organizations’ (external) dependency as well as (internal) strategy, 
and merges rather contradicting but not mutually exclusive perspectives. However, there has been a 
major critique of the theory that reproduction is prioritized instead of change. Moreover, later 
developments in neo-institutionalism offer a new perspective, based on critique of the classic new 
institutionalism’s focus on how organizations within a field resemble each other and how external 
pressure is prioritised instead of internal agency. The latter suggests that the organization takes into 
account change in its environment by adopting institutional mechanisms from other fields or 
successful parts of its own field. But, as a contradiction to diffusion, which used to be the concept for 
describing such processes of adopting institutional mechanisms, the concept of translation was 
introduced. In the further discussion, first, ‘classic neo-institutionalism’ will be sketched, and, second, 
‘the new neo- institutionalism’, translation, will be outlined. The theory will be discussed with 
specific regard to its application in the analysis of the local sport club and its relation to central sport 
policy.  
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Neo-institutionalism  
Based on the classic works of Meyer and Rowan (1991 [1977]) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991 
[19783]), Skille (2004a, 2005b) has applied neo-institutionalism in the study of Norwegian sport 
policy, to analyze: (i) how the position of the NOC as the monopolized and autonomous sport 
organization in the Norwegian society may be considered a rationalized myth (Meyer & Rowan, 
1991); and (ii) how new inventions, for example so-called alternative sport offers which were 
supposed to have other characteristics (such as flexibility and a low threshold for participation) 
compared to conventional sport (which is competitive and exclusive), undergo isomorphic processes 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) and resemble the conventional sport.   
Neo-institutionalism has received a good deal of criticism. I will discuss two of them, and 
pose some possible solutions. First, it is claimed that neo-institutionalism only explains homogeneity 
within an organizational field, while for example empirical studies from Norway reveal that the field 
of voluntary organizations in general (Sivesind et al., 2002; Wollebæk & Selle, 2002) and sport clubs 
in particular (Enjolras & Seippel,  2001; Seippel, 2003) are first and foremost reckoned by their 
heterogeneity. Second, as mentioned above, neo- institutionalism is criticized for focusing on 
external pressure when explaining institutional change, and not sufficiently taking into account the 
internal and strategic elements of an organization’s work.  
As a result, researchers have integrated various theoretical perspectives, with different 
positions on the structure-agency axis (Kikulis et al., 1995; Stevens & Slack, 1998). Thus, fundamental 
elements of agency are implicit in the institutional perspective, as long as it is human action that 
establishes, maintains and erodes institutions (Kikulis, 2000; cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1991 [1966]). 
Against this background (1. there have been successful applications of neo-institutionalism in former 
studies of Norwegian sport policy; 2. there are criticisms that cannot be overlooked; 3. there are 
examples of theoretical development), I will outline an ‘updated’ version of ne- institutionalism. The 
new perspective takes into account two major sociological debates. These are, first the discussion of 
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structure and agency; and second, the relationship between the global and the local. Consequently, 
the perspective is deemed fruitful for the study of variations between local sport clubs and their 
relationships to central sport policy. 
Translation  
The theory of translation aims to offer a framework for analyzing institutional change within 
organizations. In the case of the study of local sport clubs, change depends – among other things – 
on central sport policy, but the point of applying translation theory is that the central sport policy is 
treated within the local sport club before any outcome or impact of the policy is observable. 
Campbell (2004) criticizes former paradigms of institutionalism for not clarifying the criteria which is 
the base line when analysing institutional change and they do not clarify the underlying mechanisms 
for institutional change. Thus, he identifies two such mechanisms, namely bricolage and translation 
(Campbell, 2004: 28).  
 Bricolage refers to the recombination of existing institutional elements within a field or an 
organization: ‘… actors often craft new institutional solutions by recombining elements in their 
repertoire through an innovative process of bricolage whereby new institutions differ from but 
resemble old ones’ (Campbell, 2004: 69); while translation refers to the import of new institutional 
elements from outside the investigated field or organization.  
More specifically, new ideas are combined with already existing institutional practices and, 
therefore, are translated into local practice in varying degrees and in ways that involve a 
process very similar to bricolage. The difference is that translation involves the combination 
of new externally given elements received through diffusion as well as old locally given ones 
inherited from the past (Campbell, 2004: 80). 
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But the concept of translation implies much more than purely import, or “diffusion”, as it 
used to be called (see Berry & Berry, 1999). The (chemical/biological) metaphor of diffusion is 
something completely different from (social) translation. While diffusion is a process of movement of 
a substance from one side of a membrane to the other, based purely on the pressure difference on 
the two sides of a membrane, it is a passive process. By contrast, translation implies that the new 
element is actively imported and, when imported, actively treated to fit into the receiving context 
(institution). It involves an important translation step, which has serious implications for applicators 
of neo-institutionalism who claim that diffusion leads to homogenous outcomes after processes of 
isomorphism (Campbell, 2004). 
Translation is recombination of internal and external elements of institution. ‟It 
[translation] comprises what exists and what is created; the relationship between humans and 
ideas, ideas and objects, and humans and objects – all needed in order to understand what in 
shorthand we call “organizational change”‟ (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996: 24). Translation 
implies local agency in people‟s everyday behaviour, which includes the regulation by 
culture, for example in local sport clubs where sports activity takes place.  
… in order to bring an idea into a local cosmos from any part of the outside world, one 
has to use a cultural code … each culture has several mutually contradicting codes 
which are made available to individual people like alternative repertoires for thought. 
… [I]t is … accurate to imagine this process as a kind of ball game. Only if the actors 
catch the ball and pass it on, i.e. they collaborate, can the game continue… in this way, 
we move from the trans-mission … to the trans-formation of a thing (Rottenburg, 
1996: 214-215, original italics).   
 
The point is, for the study of sport clubs and central sport policy, that, if e.g. the health 
element of the central sport policy influences the practice of sport clubs, it does so through the sport 
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clubs’ representatives’ interpretation of the phenomenon of health. Thus, ’… it is important to retain 
the view of the individual as a human agent routinely engaged in the reproduction of social 
institutions, but with the capacity to translate them in the course of day-to-day activities’ (Spyberg, 
1996: 189). If the health argument of central sport policy influences the local sport clubs, it relies on 
the sport club representatives’ interpretation of it; health (or any element of the sport policy) will 
only be empirically observable as an interpreted and implemented version of that health-as-part-of-
sport policy. Thus: ’Translation aims at the appropriation of the external thing, which is then given 
another function, an altered meaning and often a new shape in the new context’ (Rottenburg, 1996: 
214).  
In sum, the theory of translation offers an analytical framework for analyzing the sport club, 
its processes of (re-) combinations of internal institutional elements, and processes of import, 
interpretation and implementation of external institutional elements. A critique of the translation 
theory is that the central policy is conceived as something ‘out there’, which may be or may not be 
imported, translated and implemented. The perspective does not take into account, as does the 
advocacy coalition framework, the wholeness of the sport policy field including how representatives 
of a sport organization may take part in a coalition and influence the decision making of sport policy. 
However, that may at the same time be seen as an advantage of the translation perspective, because 
the focal organization for the analysis is the implementing body of the policy process. 
Concluding remarks  
The aim of this paper was to develop an appropriate theoretical framework for analysing 
implementation of central sport policy by acknowledging and focusing on the fact that the sport club 
is the primary provider of sport, and that any sport policy to be implemented must be interpreted 
and implemented by the representatives of the sport club. In so doing, I have paved the way by 
discussing different theories for policy analysis and their application on (to some extent, Norwegian) 
empirical studies of sport policy.  
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--- Figures 3, 4, 5 around here --- 
The implementation model of van Meter and van Horn (1975), which is applied on the 
Norwegian sport policy context by Skille (2005), is a typical top-down approach which is first and 
foremost appropriate for analysis of the public sector (Figure 3, left down warded arrow). It has some 
value for analyzing the relationship between the public and the voluntary sector at the national level 
(Figure 3, left to right arrow), and limited value for analyzing the voluntary sport system (Figure 3, 
right sided and down warded arrow) because the number of volunteers – who have no obligations to 
the state – increases at the lower levels of the NOC system. On the contrary, the policy tools 
approach of Salamon (2002), as it is applied on the Norwegian context by Seippel (2005a, 2006), 
takes into consideration the fact that Norwegian sport is based  on a division of labour. On the one 
hand the public sector (DSP) provides the framework for sport implementation, by economic 
subsidies for both sports facilities and for the administration of the organization (NOC). On the other 
hand, the NOC system provides sports activity. In that vein, the division of policy tools into 
information, grants and contracts appear as fruitful.  
The ACF of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999; Sabatier, 1998), and applied by Green and 
Houlihan (2005; Houlihan, 2005), combines the best from top-down with the best from bottom-up, 
and in that respect goes beyond the problem of both the implementation model and the policy tools 
approach. Hence, the presented perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, 
what the ACF refers to as ‘guidance instruments’ (information, budgets, rules and personnel) are 
similar to policy tools (Salamon, 2002), as well as similar to the allocation of resources and the 
communication between implementing bodies of van Meter and van Horn’s (1975) implementation 
model. Thus, the two first presented theories are all circling around the top of the figures (see 
Figures 3 and 4), and/or have arrows headed mostly downwards. 
Moreover, it is probably relevant to apply the policy tools approach in the analysis of political 
subsystems at regional and local levels, too. For example, the municipality can supply public 
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information, grants and contracts in relation to the sport clubs in its area. Also with regard to the 
ACF, whose primary unit of analysis is the political subsystem which assumingly is at the national 
level, it is ‘possible to play with the units of analysis’ as well as with the level of analysis (Schlager, 
1999: 237). For example, sport clubs, the local sports council and the municipality could be 
considered as a coalition aiming at making and implementing local sport policy.  
However, empirical evidence indicates the need for a theory such as that of translation. The 
local context, specific characteristics of the local organization, and the life worlds of the 
representatives of the focal organization, are all crucial when new institutional elements are 
imported. New elements may stem from the public sector, the market, or from other parts of the 
voluntary sector in which the focal sport club operates. Regarding the former, in a study aiming at 
identifying Finnish sport clubs suitable for health promotion,xi Kokko and colleagues (2006: 226) hold: 
‘It is not self-evident that youth sport clubs will adopt health promotion as part of their activity. 
Initially, in particular, health promotion can be experienced as one more demand placed on the 
activities of the sport clubs’. For ordinary sport clubs to succeed with health promotion, Kokko et al. 
(2006: 226) have this reservation: ‘one must take into account the particular setting and its special 
characteristics’ which include the ‘unique attributes of sports systems and clubs in various contexts’ 
(Kokko et al., 2006: 226). Regarding influence from the market sector, several reports from a Danish 
study of how voluntary sport clubs adopt to the growing fitness industry or training centre culture, 
underscore how change in local sport clubs always depends on the people and conditions that are 
already inside the modernizing sport clubs (Ibsen & Møller, 2007; Madsen, Jensen & Møller, 2007).  
From the Norwegian context, there is an example of the application of the translation 
perspective, namely a study of a sport programme initiated by the state and aiming at social policy 
objectives (such as inclusion, integration and getting youths off the street). What at first glance 
seemed to be sport clubs responding to state goals of sport policy was, on the contrary, self-initiated 
activity anchored in the needs of the local environment as defined by the volunteers of the sport 
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clubs (Skille, unpublished). The work was based on a chain of mechanisms where, first, some people 
had an idea of providing activities for young people in the neighbourhood; second, these people saw 
the opportunity of using a sport club for that purpose,;and third, when programme funding became 
available the idea could be realized. In sum, the sport club representatives’ translation (Campbell, 
2004) of both state policy and adolescent lifestyle can be conceived as a meeting point of top-down 
initiatives and bottom-up demands. Sport club representatives do what is familiar to them, and 
people respond to the social environment, which is first and foremost the local  environment (Skille, 
unpublished).  
Research into sport clubs has shown that its representatives consider only what is directly 
related to their work as providers of sport activity (Enjolras & Seippel, 2001; Seippel, 2003). 
Therefore, the sport club relates to its regional special sport associations, due to organizing of 
regional sport competitions (leagues, tournaments etc.), and to the local sports council because it is 
voluntary sport’s mouthpiece in relation to municipal politics about the provisions of facilities (see 
Figure 5). For the same reason, sport clubs sometimes interact directly with the municipality. Out of 
the theories discussed in this article, the translation perspective of neo-institutionalism is the only 
one which starts at the local level. Taking the sport club as the point of departure for analyzing sport 
policy, both theoretically and empirically, it is of course possible to include other organizations in the 
model, for example local authorities (municipality).  
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Notes  
 
                                                          
i
 It could be held that the ACF is a theory of policy making, and not a theory of implementation. But I will 
include it, because (i) it offers an attempt to se the policy process as a whole, and because (ii) it has been 
successfully applied in sport studies. See below. 
ii
 In international literature, these are usually referred to as national sport federations. I translate the Norwegian 
denomination of the federations, which is based on the Norwegian word for “special”, to make the point that the 
special sport federation line contradicts the other line, which comprises the common sport issues.   
iii
 There are a very few exceptions, namely those of national teams and regional teams at the level of special sport 
associations federations and regional special sport associations, respectively. 
iv
 There are relationships between the public and the voluntary sector at other levels than that of the state (DSP-
NOC), but these are too various across counties and municipalities to be treated here.  
v
 It is, however, possible to create secondary measurements. For example, Skille (2005b) measured sport 
participation as a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for social integration through sport. Further, Seippel 
(2005b: 255) measured social integration in/through sport by empirically measuring social and material 
reciprocity.  
vi
 The first three are: The stages model, „which is based on a division of the policy process into a series of 
discrete stages following the rational actor model‟ (Houlihan, 2005: 168); Institutional analysis, where 
institutions are considered as something that „constrain choice through their capacity to shape actors‟ perceptions 
of both problems and acceptable solutions‟ (Houlihan, 2005: 170); The multiple streams framework, which „is 
primarily concerned with the process of agenda setting‟ (Houlihan, 2005: 171) and which offers „a powerful 
critique of rational models … and … institutional interests‟ (Houlihan, 2005: 172). 
vii
 These are: Green and Houlihan (2005) on elite sports development in three different countries; Parrish‟s 
(2003) study of sport policy in the European Union; and Houlihan and White (2002) on sport development 
policy in the UK.  
viii
 Cf. information as a policy tool. 
ix
 However, the ACF admits a variety of constraints (which may, if analyzed with that aim, lead to the 
identification of dominance within the coalitions or subsystems), such as: time and computational constraints, 
that actors weigh loss more heavily than gains, and that actors‟ perceptions, interpretations and actions are 
filtered and steered by pre-existing beliefs (Sabatier, 1998: 109; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 131). 
x
 The terms ‟classic neo-institutionalism‟ and ‟new neo-institutionalism‟ are not established or commonly used 
in the literature. But they are applied here to distinguish between epochs and to point out the development that 
has taken place within neo-institutional theory the last years.  
xi
 The study‟s outset was the Word Health Organization‟s Ottawa Charter for Health promotion, and its emphasis 
on „the importance of finding new settings in which to carry out health promotion‟ (Kokko et al., 2006: 219).  
